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This paper analyzes the performance of the commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) market
before and during the recent financial crisis. Using a comprehensive sample of CMBS deals from 1996
to 2008, we show that (unlike the residential mortgage market) the loans underlying CMBS did not
significantly change their characteristics during this period, commercial lenders did not change the
way they priced a given loan, defaults remained in line with their levels during the entire 1970s and
1980s and, overall, the CMBS and CMBX markets performed as normal during the financial crisis
(at least by the standards of other recent market downturns). We show that the recent collapse of the
CMBS market was caused primarily by the rating agencies allowing subordination levels to fall to
levels that provided insufficient protection to supposedly "safe" tranches. This ratings inflation in turn
allowed financial firms to engage in ratings arbitrage.
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The rating agencies have taken a large share of the blame for the recent nancial crisis.1 For
example, Tomlinson and Evans (2007), in an early Bloomberg report on the subprime crisis,
quote Satyajit Das, a former banker at Citigroup:
\The models are ne. But they have an input problem. It becomes a num-
ber we pluck out of the air. They could be wrong, and the ratings could be
misleading."
The same report quotes Brian McManus, head of CDO Research at Wachovia:
\With CDOs, they underestimated the volatility of the subprime asset class
in determining how much leverage was OK."
However, before concluding that the rating agencies were to blame, it is important to control
for many other factors aecting these markets. For example, it is well documented that
there was a signicant drop in the quality of residential mortgages in the years preceding
the nancial crisis, especially in the subprime sector, fueled both by lower underwriting
standards and by dishonesty on the part of borrowers and lenders.2 Many have also blamed
problems in the credit default swap (CDS) market.3 Given all of these confounding factors,
1For further discussion, see Bank for International Settlements (2008). Theoretical models explaining
ratings ination over time include Opp, Opp, and Harris (2010) and Sangiorgi, Sokobin, and Spatt (2009).
2See, for example, Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009). On April 12, 2010, Senator Carl Levin, D-Mich.,
chair of the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, issued a statement prior to beginning
a series of hearings on the Financial Crisis. In the statement, he addressed some of the lending practices
of Washington Mutual, the largest thrift in the U.S. until it was seized by the government and sold to J.P.
Morgan Chase in 2008 (see U.S. Senate Press Release, \Senate Subcommittee Launches Series of Hearings
on Wall Street And The Financial Crisis," April 12, 2010). Among other allegations, the statement claims:
\One FDIC review of 4,000 Long Beach loans in 2003, found that less than a quarter could
be properly sold to investors. A 2005 review of loans from two of Washington Mutual's top
producing retail loan ocers found fraud in 58% of the loans coming from one loan ocer's
operations and 83% from the other. Yet those two loan ocers continued working for the bank
for three years, receiving prizes for their loan production. A 2008 review found that sta in
another top loan producer's oce had been literally manufacturing borrower information to
speed up production."
\Documents obtained by the Subcommittee also show that, at a critical time, Washington
Mutual selected loans for its securities because they were likely to default, and failed to disclose
that fact to investors. It also included loans that had been identied as containing fraudulent
borrower information, again without alerting investors when the fraud was discovered. An
internal 2008 report found that lax controls had allowed loans that had been identied as
fraudulent to be sold to investors."
3See Stulz (2009) for a detailed discussion. Stanton and Wallace (2009) show, for example, that during
the crisis, prices for ABX.HE indexed CDS, backed by pools of residential MBS, implied default rates over
1it has proved hard to extract the separate role of the rating agencies in the recent crisis,
despite the wealth of anecdotal evidence, and there has so far been little empirical work on
this question in the academic literature.4
In this paper, we shed new light on the role of the rating agencies in the crisis by focusing
on the CMBS market. There are several reasons why this market is ideal for this purpose.
First, we have access to large amounts of very detailed information on the loans underlying
the securities. Second, unlike the residential MBS market, all agents in the CMBS market
can reasonably be viewed as sophisticated, informed investors.5 Third, as we shall show (and
also unlike the RMBS market), there were no major changes in the underlying market for
commercial loans over this period; and fourth, as we shall also show, unlike the ABX market
(indexed credit default swaps written on pools of RMBS), the CMBX market functioned
normally both before and during the crisis. As a result, we can rule out many of the
confounding factors that make studying other markets so dicult, and focus more clearly
just on the role played by the rating agencies.
Prior to the recent nancial crisis, the U.S. commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS)
market had expanded rapidly, with an average annual growth rate of about 18% from 1997
to 2007, at which point it stood second only to commercial banks as a source of credit to the
commercial real estate sector.6 Since 2007, however, there have been large write-downs on
the CMBS holdings of nancial institutions, followed by the virtual collapse of the CMBS
market in the United States. This has led to a commercial mortgage funding shortfall of
about $200 billion, and a growing problem with so called \maturity defaults," caused by the
inability of current commercial real estate borrowers to renance the outstanding balances
on their maturing mortgages.
We nd that while there are certainly some similarities to events in the RMBS market,
the dierences between the markets are more striking. In particular, while it is common to
talk about events in the RMBS market as being a \hundred-year storm," we show that the
CMBS market did not perform noticeably worse during the crisis of 2007{2009 than it had
done numerous times in recent history, prompting the question: Why did this crisis cause
100% on the underlying loans, and were uncorrelated with the credit performance of the underlying loans.
Many institutions incurred large losses through using ABX.HE prices to mark their MBS holdings to market.
4There are some notable exceptions. In particular, Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2009)
study credit ratings in the RMBS market, and Grin and Tang (2009) look at CDO ratings.
5For example, the B-piece investors in CMBS hold dual roles as bond investors (if the assets remain
current on their obligations) and controlling interests (if the loans default and go into special servicing).
Thus, the below-investment-grade CMBS investor is usually a real estate specialist with extensive knowledge
about the underlying assets and mortgages in the pools.
6By the end of the third quarter of 2007, outstanding CMBS funded $637.2 billion, commercial banks
$1,186.2 billion, and insurance companies $246.2 billion of the total $2.41 trillion of outstanding commercial
mortgages [see Federal Reserve Z.1 Release (Flow of Funds), Third Quarter 2007].
2the CMBS and commercial real estate loan markets to collapse, when the commercial loan
market had survived many similar prior downturns?
The short answer is that the CMBS market collapsed because, in the period leading up
to the latest crisis, the rating agencies allowed subordination levels to fall to levels that
provided insucient protection to supposedly \safe" tranches.7 Prima facie evidence of this
is provided by Figure 1, which shows how subordination levels fell between 1996 and 2007
(with a slight rise in 2008) for all classes of CMBS bonds.8
Of course, there are many possible interpretations of this result. Perhaps (as commonly
asserted prior to 2007), in the early days of CMBS issuance, the rating agencies were too
conservative, and they updated their views as they saw realized losses.9 Or perhaps the loans
themselves were changing over time in a way that made the CMBS bonds safer for a given
subordination level. To conclude that subordination levels were too low by 2005, we need
to rule out such alternative explanations. To do so, we perform a comprehensive analysis of
the CMBS market both before and after the crisis, using a number of dierent data sets to
answer several related questions:
1. Did the quality of loans underlying CMBS change leading up to the crisis?
2. Did the pricing of the loans underlying CMBS change?
3. How did default expectations prior to the crisis compare with the protection provided
by the then-current subordination levels?
4. How did realized defaults during the crisis compare with those in recent prior down-
turns?
5. What default rates would we have seen using today's subordination levels in earlier
downturns?
6. What default rates would we have seen using 1996's (say) subordination levels in 2008?
7. Did related markets, such as the CMBX indexed CDS market, lose touch with funda-
mentals during the crisis, as happened with the ABX.HE?
7The subordination level is the maximum amount of principal loss on the underlying mortgage that can
occur without a given security suering any loss.
8The apparent rise in the subordination level for \AAA above AJ" bonds is illusory. Prior to 2004, the
rating agencies reported the level of subordination underlying all of the AAA securities. From 2004 on, it
became standard practice to re-tranche the overall principal balance of the AAA securities into an AAA
waterfall with senior and junior AAA rated bonds. This caused an apparent increase in the subordination
levels of the most senior (and usually shortest duration) of the AAA bonds, because their reported subordi-
nation included the balances of the subordinate AAA bonds. However, the principal allocation to the senior
AAA bond (labeled \AAA above AJ") is not comparable to the AAA support in prior periods. The series
labeled \All AAA" shows the subordination underlying the rst dollar of AAA bonds, is consistent with the
pre-2004 denition, and shows the same decline up to 2007 seen for the other ratings.
9See Wheeler (2001).
3Figure 1: CMBS Weighted Average Subordination Levels
This gure plots the annual average percentage of subordination by bond class for the universe
of 531 fusion and conduit CMBS deals originated in the United States from 1996 through 2008.
Conduit CMBS deals include mid-sized (median $6M and mean $15M original balance) commercial
and multifamily loans that were originated for securitization, whereas fusion CMBS involve not only
standard size conduit loans but also include large loans with balances of $35M or more. Starting in
2004, it became standard practice to re-tranche the overall principal balance of the AAA securities
into senior and junior AAA-rated bonds. This caused an apparent increase in the subordination
levels of the most senior (and usually shortest duration) of the AAA bonds (labeled \AAA above
AJ"), because their reported subordination included the balances of the subordinate AAA bonds.
However, this reported subordination level is not comparable to the AAA support in prior periods.
The series labeled \All AAA," showing the subordination underlying the rst dollar of AAA bonds,
is consistent with the pre-2004 denition. The data were obtained from Bloomberg, CMAlert
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4We nd that i. (unlike the RMBS market) CMBS loans did not signicantly change their
characteristics during this period, ii. CMBS lenders did not change the way they priced a
given loan, iii. overall, the CMBS market performed as normal during the nancial crisis (at
least by the standards of other recent market downturns), and iv. (unlike the ABX market)
the CMBX market for indexed credit default swaps backed by CMBS behaved normally
during the crisis. The only signicant dierence between this downturn and prior down-
turns was the enormous reductions in subordination levels required by the rating agencies
to qualify a bond for a given credit rating. Indeed, had the 2005 vintage CMBS used the
subordination levels from 2000, there would have been no losses to the senior bonds in most
CMBS structures.
This decrease in subordination levels (with corresponding increase in the proportion of
AAA-rated CMBS), unaccompanied by any change in the quality of the underlying loans, is
consistent with the theoretical predictions of Opp et al. (2010). They argue that, especially
for complex securities, regulatory distortions (in this case, the reduction in risk-based capital
weights for AAA-rate CMBS compared with lower rated whole loans) can reduce or eliminate
the incentive for rating agencies to acquire information, in turn leading to rating ination.
As we shall discuss later, these incentives were particularly strong in the CMBS market
because of explicit regulatory changes in the years leading up to the crisis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature;
Section 3 analyzes the quality and pricing of the loans underlying CMBS before and during
the crisis. Section 4 examines ex ante default expectations and realized default behavior.
Section 5 examines the behavior of the CMBX market. In Section 6 we discuss the risk-based
capital implications of ratings ination for FDIC-regulated nancial institutions. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
The empirical papers most closely related to ours are Grin and Tang (2009), Ashcraft et al.
(2009), and Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009). Grin and Tang (2009) analyze the outputs of
a rating agency's credit model for a sample of CDOs between 1997 and 2007. They nd that
the actual size of the AAA tranche in each deal was almost always larger than the model
suggested, by an average of over 12% but in many cases much more. They are unable to
explain these adjustments using variables related to default risk, and nd that the average
size of the adjustments increased in the years up to 2007. These results, using data from
dierent (though related) markets, are a good complement to ours. In particular, while
Grin and Tang (2009) have direct access to a rating agency's model (which we do not), we
5have access to much more detailed information on the loans underlying our bonds. In both
cases, the conclusion is the same: the only thing that materially changed over this period
was the rating agencies' allowable subordination levels.
Ashcraft et al. (2009) analyze the validity of agencies' ratings of sub-prime and Alt-A
residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) between 2001 and 2007. They nd impor-
tant declines in risk-adjusted RMBS subordination between 2005 and mid-2007 and observ-
ably riskier deals signicantly under-performed relative to their initial subordination levels.
Ashcraft et al. (2009) conclude that their ndings are consistent with two theoretical predic-
tions found in the literature: i. ratings ination could be associated with increased security
opacity (proxied by the degree of no-documentation loans in pools) and ii. the benets of a
fee-based revenue model and high rates of security issuance could swamp the reputational
costs of erroneous ratings (see Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) and Sangiorgi et al. (2009) for
the rst prediction and Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2009) and Mathis, McAndrews, and
Rochet (2009) for the second). The use of both loan-level and bond-level data in our study
is similar to the strategy implemented by Ashcraft et al. (2009). However, an important
dierence between the two studies is that we nd no evidence that the CMBS market was
exposed to the confounding eects of signicantly deteriorating and/or fraudulent mortgage
underwriting practices that aected the RMBS market over the same period.
Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) nd that 70.7% of the dollar amount of CDOs received a
AAA rating, whereas the collateral that supported these issues had average credit ratings of
B+. They hypothesize, but do not empirically test, that the CDO subordination structure
was driven by rating-dependent regulation and asymmetric information. Similar to these
ndings, we nd that the commercial real estate loans in the CMBS pools would typically
have received a credit rating of BBB or below, whereas the level of AAA CMBS bond issuance
reached 88% in 2006.10
Many recent theoretical treatments of ratings shopping (see, for example, Skreta and
Veldkamp (2009), Bolton et al. (2009), and Sangiorgi et al. (2009)), assume that investors
are naive or easily fooled by the rating agencies' practices of revealing only the highest ratings.
The greater sophistication of CMBS investors makes this assumption less tenable. Instead,
the CMBS market appears to t more naturally into informed rational expectations frame-
works with regulatory distortions (see Opp et al. (2010), Coval, Jurek, and Staord (2009),
Merton and Perold (1993)). In Opp et al. (2010), a fully rational model, large regulatory
distortions are sucient to eliminate delegated information acquisition by rating agencies
and this outcome is more likely with complex securities. The importance of regulatory dis-
10See The Structured Credit Handbook, New York, John Wiley, 2007. This information was also obtained
from discussions with CMBS servicers.
6tortions may explain another feature of CMBS performance: the yields of AAA bonds were
quite low (about 20 basis points to swaps) until the height of the crisis in July of 2007, while
those on BBB- bonds were consistently very high (about 200 basis points to swaps) over the
same period.11 An alternative possible explanation for the willingness of informed investors,
such as nancial institutions, to accept both ratings ination and low yields on AAA CMBS
tranches, may be that AAA ratings were of rst order importance to the capital management
strategies of these institutions, given the regulatory capital reductions aorded by the AAA
label.12
3 Loan quality and loan pricing over time
If the drop in subordination levels was justied, there must have been other factors in the
market that changed over time. We therefore here look at the quality of the underlying loans
and their pricing.
3.1 Loan quality
It is well documented that there was a signicant drop in quality in the residential mortgage
market in the years preceding the nancial crisis, especially in the subprime sector, fueled
both by lower underwriting standards and by dishonesty on the part of borrowers and lenders.
It is therefore important to understand whether a similar quality deterioration occurred in
the commercial loan market.13
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the 531 conduit and fusion CMBS deals originated
between 1996 and 2008 in the United States. Conduit CMBS pools include mid-sized (median
$6M and mean $15M original balance) commercial loans that were originated for securitiza-
tion, whereas fusion CMBS pools include not only standard size conduit loans but also large
commercial loans with balances of $35M or more. Overall, these CMBS pools accounted for
90,103 commercial real estate loans at origination. The data used to compute these summary
statistics were obtained from CMAlert (http://www.cmalert.com/). As shown in Table 1,
while there are dierences in the loan characteristics from year to year, there are no strong
trends in either the Loan-to-Value Ratio (LTV). The LTV varies only very slightly during
the sample, as does the Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR). There does appear to be a
11The yield data were obtained from Commercial Mortgage Alert, various issues, 2005{2007.
12See Opp et al. (2010) for a theoretical development of this argument and Coval et al. (2009) who draw
the same empirical conclusion.
13Of course, if commercial loan quality actually improved, this would be one potential justication for
lowering subordination levels over time.
7Table 1: Loan Underwriting Trends 1996 through 2008
The table presents summary statistics for the loan-underwriting characteristics for 90,103
loans that were securitized into the universe of 531 conduit or fusion CMBS pools in the
United States from 1996 through 2008. The data were obtained from Bloomberg and CMAlert
http://www.cmalert.com/.
CMBS Loan to Average Debt Service Pool
Origination CMBS Value Number Coverage Coupon Maturity Size
Date Pools Ratio of Loans Ratio ($10M)
1996 20 67.27 124.45 1.45 8.78 129.41 49.85
1997 22 69.21 181.71 1.41 8.53 129.11 78.06
1998 36 69.62 269.22 1.46 7.45 128.69 110.59
1999 38 68.94 209.11 1.43 7.54 127.06 72.53
2000 32 67.98 154.00 1.41 8.17 121.83 59.50
2001 35 68.19 143.26 1.46 7.62 113.35 60.45
2002 34 68.31 126.09 1.58 6.98 112.79 58.92
2003 45 67.07 121.76 1.77 5.69 120.47 62.51
2004 62 68.00 116.16 1.69 5.78 106.93 58.81
2005 64 68.89 170.33 1.61 5.47 110.10 90.25
2006 70 68.29 200.20 1.47 5.91 114.65 98.66
2007 65 68.90 214.25 1.40 5.99 119.67 118.40
2008 8 67.32 102.25 1.38 6.31 107.38 53.72
Overall
Mean 68.36 166.77 1.52 6.68 117.33 78.50
Overall
Std. Dev. 3.86 94.05 0.24 1.31 32.97 41.88
8downward trend in DSCR from 2004, indicating less cushion for covering debt service and
possibly a return to the weaker cash ow structure of the earlier deals in 1996.14 There is
certainly little in these statistics to indicate signicant changes, especially improvements, in
credit quality over time that would justify large reductions in subordination levels.
Even if the quality of individual loans of each type remains the same, it is still possible
for the quality of CMBS mortgage pools to change over time if the mixture of loan types
in each pool changes. To investigate this possibility, Figure 2 shows the mix of dierent
property types underlying the same 531 CMBS deals where, again, we obtained the data
from CMAlert (http://www.cmalert.com/) and Bloomberg. It can be seen that there was a
substantial rebalancing of the loan composition of the pools away from multi-family loans to
oce loans. The share of hotel loans also increased over the period from about 10% to 15%.
Hotel loans are usually considered riskier loans, due to the volatility of leisure/travel demand,
while oce are usually considered slightly less risky. Overall, the property concentration does
not suggest any signicant trends in CMBS default risk.
3.2 Loan pricing
While measurable aspects of loan quality, such as LTV and DSCR, did not change materially
in the years leading up to the crisis, it is possible that these measures do not fully capture all
aspects of the perceived riskiness of the loans. In particular, it is possible that the market's
estimates of default probabilities for a given loan changed over the period in a manner that
was uncorrelated with LTV and DSCR. This would justify changing subordination levels,
but would not necessarily show up as a change in LTV or DSCR values. However, it would
show up as a change in pricing (or equivalently, the coupon rate) over time for a loan with
given characteristics.15
14The summary statistics in the later periods are potentially less informative due to the appearance of
pro forma underwriting. The number of pro forma underwritten loans grew from late 2005 through 2007.
With pro forma underwriting, borrowers were allowed to use anticipated rather than actual contractual
lease cash ows. A notable example of the problems that arose with this underwriting is the $5.4 billion
default on Stuyvesant Town/Peter Cooper Village by Tishman Speyer and BlackRock Realty. For CMBX
2006-1, there were 92 loans that were included with pro forma underwriting or 3.6% by balance. By CMBX
2007-2, this grew to 353 loans or 13.6% by balance (Source: tracy kantrowitztrepp.com). Interestingly, as
will shall discuss later, the CMBX 2006-1 has consistently outperformed the other indices, including the
CMBX 2006-2, CMBX 2007-1, and CMBX 2008-1 indices, which included no pro forma underwritten loans.
The CMBX 2007-2 has under-performed the other indices. Thus, pro forma underwriting per se is unlikely
to be a sucient standalone indicator of poor underwriting quality. A second potential issue with these
summary statistics is that from 2005 through 2007 the CMBS prospectuses explicitly allowed borrowers to
add mezzanine debt on properties with existing securitized mortgages.
15Moreover, even if everyone's expectations were wrong, the story about rating agencies becoming less
conservative in their default estimates over time would be more reasonable if other market participants were
also becoming less conservative.
9Figure 2: CMBS pool composition, 1996{2008
This gure shows the property-type composition of the universe of 531 CMBS pools that
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10We perform two dierent analyses to investigate whether commercial real estate loan un-
derwriting standards changed over the pre-crisis period. First, we analyze the composition
of the spread between the loan contract rates and the 10-year constant maturity Treasury
rates for a large sample of securitized commercial mortgages over this period. Then, since
commercial mortgage loan underwriting characteristics are determined jointly, we carry out
a second structural modeling analysis, which accounts for the true nonlinear relationship be-
tween commercial mortgage contract variables and the embedded options in these contracts.
In this analysis, we use the Titman and Torous (1989) two-factor mortgage valuation model
to estimate loan-by-loan implied volatilities at origination for the commercial real estate
loans in our sample. In this analysis, we would expect that any change in default expecta-
tions should translate into an increase or decrease in the embedded implied volatilities in
these contracts over time.
Regression analysis For our empirical analysis of the pre-crisis trends in loan underwrit-
ing, we assemble a sample of loan-level data for 14,041 non-seasoned xed-rate mortgages
underlying 206 public CMBS pools securitized between 1997 and the rst quarter of 2005.16
The loan data were obtained from the public access websites for two CMBS trustees: Wells
Fargo Trust Services and LaSalle. The 206 CMBS pools included in the pre-crisis loan-level
sample represent about 64% of the fusion and conduit CMBS deals reported Table 1 (the
1997 through 2004 pools, plus sixteen rst quarter 2005 pools). Our pre-crisis sampling
period corresponds to a time period over which CMBS subordination levels experienced dra-
matic declines, as shown in Figure 1, and yet it precedes, by at least two years, generally
acknowledged market indicators of the nancial crisis (see Tong and Wei (2008)).
In Table 2, we report our regression analysis of the pre-crisis components of commercial
mortgage contract rate spreads to the ten-year constant maturity Treasure rates at the date
of the origination of each loan. Although all mortgage terms are jointly determined, we nd
that the loan-to-value ratio and the debt-service coverage ratios are highly correlated,17 so
we report two sets of regressions. One set is for spread as a function of loan characteristics,
excluding DSCR, but including property type and loan-origination year dummies for 1996{
2004. Column 1 of this set does not include xed eects; column 2 includes xed eects and
clusters the standard errors using the month of origination to control for other sources of
unobserved heterogeneity. The second set of regressions excludes the LTV ratio but includes
16We focus on non-seasoned loans, excluding loans that exceed twelve months of seasoning, because we
only observe each loan's loan-to-value ratio at the pool origination date. We also exclude oating rate loans,
which appeared primarily in the 1997 and 1998 vintage loans. The seasoning exclusion eliminates about
three thousand loans, and the oating rate exclusion another twenty seven hundred loans. These exclusions,
plus missing data, leave 14,041 loans in our loan-level sample.
17A regression of LTV on DSCR and no intercept has an R2 of .80.
11all other characteristics. Here, column 3 of this set does not include xed eects; column
4 includes xed eects and clusters the standard errors using the month of origination to
control for other sources of unobserved heterogeneity. As shown, although all of the year
dummies are dierent from zero, there is no obvious trend in the dummies over time other
than that spreads in 2003 and 2004 were closer to the benchmark 2005 spreads than those in
prior years. These results suggest that although subordination levels were changing over this
period, lenders were not signicantly changing the way they priced the underlying loans.
Implied volatility analysis In the model of Titman and Torous (1989), the value of a
mortgage, M, is a function of interest rates, r, and property prices, p, which evolve together
as:
drt = (r   rt)dt + r
p
rt dWr;t; (1)
dpt = (p;t   qp)pt dt + ppt dWp;t: (2)
The implied volatility of a newly issued mortgage is dened as the volatility which sets the
value of a newly issued mortgage equal to par. Details of the estimation procedure and of
the loan characteristics are provided in Appendix A. Table 3 reports loan-by-loan implied
volatility estimates. Oce and industrial properties exhibit the highest implied volatilities,
at 23.8% and 24.1%, respectively. For retail properties, the average implied volatility is
21.5%, and for multifamily properties it is 19.7%. These volatilities are substantially higher
than the values that have previously appeared in the literature.18
Figure 3 shows estimated implied volatilities by property type over time. Despite some
variation, the main conclusion mirrors that from the regression analysis above: there are no
obvious trends in implied volatilities over time. Expressed dierently, even though subordi-
nation levels were changing dramatically over this period, after controlling for loan terms,
interest rates, etc., lenders' estimates of default likelihoods remained approximately the same.
4 Default behavior
We have shown so far that, despite the changes in subordination levels required by the rating
agencies, there were no other signicant changes in the CMBS market over this period. Loan
18The few existing studies of implied volatility predate the development of the modern CMBS market.
Titman and Torous (1989) apply a two factor model using quoted mortgage contract rates (as opposed
to transaction rates) from 1985 through 1987. Ciochetti and Vandell (1999) and Holland, Ott, and Rid-
diough (2000) both calculate implied volatilities from one-factor mortgage valuation models, using mortgage
origination data from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s.
12Table 2: Regression of Contract Rate Spread on Loan Characteristics
The table presents regression results for the contract rate spread, measured as the dierence between
the loan contract rate at origination and the ten year constant maturity Treasury rate on the
origination date. The data for the analysis include 14,028 loans that were securitized in 206 CMBS
pools from 1996 through 2005. The loan-level data were obtained from from the CTSlink website,
http://www.ctslink.com/, for the Wells Fargo Trustee.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
spread spread spread spread
Origination Principal (000) -0.000552 -0.000563 -0.000545 -0.000554
(-17.45) (-18.31) (-16.60) (-17.35)
Amortization Term -0.000534 -0.000535 -0.000464 -0.000465
(-8.29) (-8.55) (-7.17) (-7.38)
Loan-to-Value Ratio at Origination 0.329 0.335
(10.37) (10.88)
Debt Service Coverage Ratio on NOI -0.100 -0.106
(-13.01) (-14.13)
Industrial Property 0.0134 0.0108 -0.00345 -0.00471
(0.92) (0.76) (-0.22) (-0.31)
Multi-Family Property -0.192 -0.198 -0.186 -0.192
(-17.92) (-18.98) (-16.42) (-17.42)
Retail Property 0.00473 0.00426 0.00706 0.00676
(0.45) (0.42) (0.64) (0.63)
Origination year 1996 1.220 1.325 1.282 1.362
(23.10) (25.39) (23.63) (25.35)
Origination year 1997 0.795 0.881 0.790 0.854
(27.48) (30.28) (27.66) (29.58)
Origination year 1998 0.603 0.675 0.596 0.650
(21.31) (24.03) (21.40) (23.40)
Origination year 1999 1.145 1.191 1.090 1.116
(36.22) (38.02) (33.94) (34.90)
Origination year 2000 1.196 1.267 1.147 1.205
(39.25) (41.56) (35.24) (37.11)
Origination year 2001 1.271 1.346 1.248 1.303
(44.99) (47.76) (44.51) (46.34)
Origination year 2002 1.097 1.165 1.085 1.137
(38.84) (41.40) (38.50) (40.43)
Origination year 2003 0.661 0.728 0.654 0.703
(23.25) (25.84) (23.14) (24.98)
Origination year 2004 0.246 0.318 0.242 0.293
(8.63) (11.22) (8.60) (10.45)
Constant 1.228 1.157 1.587 1.547
(32.13) (30.66) (43.98) (43.30)
Observations 14041 14041 14041 14041
R2 0.4305 0.4432 0.4344 0.4483
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
13Figure 3: Implied Volatilities by Property Type
This gure plots our calibrated implied volatilities by property type. The solid line plots the
median implied volatility for mortgage originated within a quarter. The bottom dashed line plots








1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Industrial
Quartiles























1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Retail
14Table 3: Implied Volatilities by Property Type
The table presents the computed implied instantaneous volatilities for our sample of loans. The
implied volatility is dened for each loan as the value of p in Equation (8) that sets the initial
value of the loan equal to par.
No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 25th Percentile 75th Percentile
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Oce 2,227 23.8 7.8 18.8 27.4
Multifamily 4,028 19.7 7.6 14.9 21.9
Retail 4,205 21.5 7.6 16.4 25.1
Industrial 1,234 24.1 7.8 18.8 28.2
characteristics and pool composition remained roughly the same, and lenders did not change
how they priced a given loan. The rating agencies' behavior was thus out of line with the
rest of the market. However, we cannot yet conclude that subordination levels were too
low at the end of the period (rather than too high at the beginning). To address this, we
need to look at default behavior. In this section, we do this, looking at both ex ante default
expectations and ex post performance.
4.1 Modeling ex ante default expectations
To analyze ex ante default expectations, we combine the levels of subordination with a
statistical model for defaults over time to ask i. what future defaults could reasonably have
been expected at the time the CMBS were issued? and ii. were these expectations consistent
with the agencies' stated criteria for bonds of dierent ratings? We model the distribution
of defaults over time using the Titman and Torous (1989) model described above, inserting
our property-specic implied volatilities from Section 3.2 into the property price evolution
described by Equation (2). Before doing this, however, it is necessary to model the correlation
between defaults on dierent loans in a pool.
Correlation between loans While the correlation between mortgages in a pool does not
aect the total value of all CMBS tranches,19 it does aect the relative values of dierent
19Ignoring spreads and/or liquidity dierences, the total CMBS cash ow equals the total mortgage cash
ow, and the value of each mortgage does not depend on correlation. Thus, in particular, changes in
correlation cannot cause subordination levels on all bonds to shrink at the same time.
15tranches. In general, more dispersion (more correlation) lowers the value of safer tranches,
and increases the value of extremely risky tranches.20 The tranches most adversely aected
by greater dispersion of mortgage default would be not the AAA securities (which are pro-
tected even if defaults are substantially higher than expected), but the securities slightly
lower down in priority, such as BBB. In estimating default expectations, it is therefore im-
portant to take correlation between individual mortgages into account. To do this, we split
the return shocks for each property into two components, a common component shared
across all properties, and a property-specic component, whose volatility varies by property
type. More precisely, we simulate draws from the following system:
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i;t is the price of property i, of type j (where i = 1;2;3;4;5 indexes apartment, oce,
retail, industrial, and all other properties, respectively), dWt is common across all properties,
and dW i
t is an independent shock for each property. We use the total return volatility
published by the National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) as an
estimate of the systematic component, 7.019%. We then set the idiosyncratic volatility
for each property type to match the total volatilities given in Table 3. For example, the
idiosyncratic volatility for oce properties is set to pi=0:2274, implying a total volatility
for oce properties of
p
0:070192 + 0:22742 = 0:238;
the relevant value in Table 3.21
Simulation Details To estimate the default behavior of pools of mortgages, we rst cre-
ate a simulated pool, containing 100 mortgages, with types chosen to match the average
proportions seen in the data: 25 apartment, 20 oce, 30 retail, 10 industrial, and 15 \other"
(proxied by national averages). For each mortgage, we randomly draw an LTV so that we
match the sample mean and standard deviation of the origination LTV ratios for the prop-
20The dependence on dispersion/correlation arises because tranching makes CMBS payos nonlinear in
the default rates of the underlying mortgages. Hence, by Jensen's Inequality, the expected cash ow to a
CMBS is not equal to its cash ow at the expected default rate on the underlying mortgages, the dierence
depending on the volatility of the cash ows. As an example, suppose that a CMBS structure protected
against losses up to 10%, and the expected loss on the mortgages was 10%. If the default rate were certain,
then the CMBS would experience a 0% default rate. If the default rate were uncertain, and, say, had a
fty percent chance of a 0% or 20% default realization, the CMBS would have an expected loss of 5% of
underlying principal.
21Note that the common shock to the property return processes induces correlation in defaults across the
mortgages in the pool.
16erty's type. Within each property type, though the mortgages dier in their initial LTV
ratio, they share the sample average coupon level, term, and amortization schedule.
Given the composition of the pool, we now make 5,000 draws from the system of equa-
tions (3) and (4), and keep track of the frequency with which the joint interest rate and
property price process moves into the region where each borrower optimally chooses to
default both over the term of the mortgage and at maturity.22 We compute the default
frequency by quarter by computing the proportion of the original 100 mortgages in the pool
that default, and then calculate cumulative default rates by summing the quarterly default
rates.
Expected Default Rates Figure 4 shows the distribution of cumulative default rates
using our implied volatility measures. The solid line indicates the median cumulative default
rate across the simulations, the dashed lines show the approximate location of the 25th and
75th percentiles, and the dotted lines show the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively. As
can be seen, for approximately the rst two years from origination, there are virtually no
defaults, consistent with the fact that, by and large, the simulated loans carry low LTV
levels. Starting around year two, defaults begin to ramp up, with the median cumulative
default rate reaching 4.7% 15 quarters after origination, with an interquartile range of 6.5%
to 2.3%. At the end of the 10-year horizon, the median cumulative default rate is 21%,
with an interquartile range from 15% to 29%. Applying a 40% severity-of-loss rule, the 21%
median cumulative default rate reported in Figure 4 implies a median 8.4% loss rate over a
ten year horizon.
Adequacy of CMBS subordination levels Given our simulated distribution of de-
faults, we can now analyze the adequacy of observed subordination levels. To do so, we use
the subordination levels reported in Figure 1, and assume that loan losses will stay at the
historical average of 40% (see Johnson and MacNeill (2005)). Given this long-run historical
loss rate and the observed subordination levels, Table 4 shows the default rates that would
be required to generate losses to the various tranches, ranging from risky (class BBB) to
very safe (AAA). Focusing in particular on the BBB tranche (the story is similar for other
tranches), the percent of defaults required to generate losses to investors would be 13.3% for
2004 pools, 12.0% for 2005 pools, 11.5% for 2006 pools, and 11.5% for 2007 pools. Based
upon the simulation results reported in Figure 4, all of these values are well below the median
default rate of 21% generated by our model. Given our cumulative default estimates over
22The default boundary for each loan is determined as part of the numerical solution of the pricing p.d.e.,
Equation (8) in the Appendix.
17Figure 4: Simulated Cumulative Default Rates
This gures shows the distribution of cumulative default rates under our implied volatility mea-
sure. The solid line indicates the median cumulative default rate across the simulations, the
dashed lines show the approximate location of the 25th and 75th percentiles, and the dot-
ted lines show the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively. We make 5,000 draws from the
system of Equations (3) and (4) and keep track of the rst time that each mortgage de-
faults along a simulated path of interest rates and property returns. For each LTV level
and property type, we compute the default frequency by quarter. The weighted-average de-
fault frequency for the pool is computed using the property-type frequencies and the LTVs as











































18Table 4: Implied Default Rates
The table displays estimates for the percentage of loan defaults in a pool that would be required to
generate losses for tranched classes with ratings from AAA to BBB-. The reported weighted-
average subordination levels are those observed for the universe of CMBS pools originated in
2004 through 2007. The subordination structure for these pools were obtained from CMAlert,
(http://www.CMAlert.com/).
Percentage Historical Defaults
Class Subordination Loss Severity Required for Loss
% % %
2004 CMBS Conduit Pools - Number of Pools = 62
AAA 15.3 40.0 38.3
AA 11.8 40.0 29.5
A 8.8 40.0 22.0
BBB 5.5 40.0 13.7
BBB- 3.9 40.0 9.8
2005 CMBS Conduit Pools - Number of Pools = 64
Short-Senior AAA 26.5 40.0 66.3
Long-Junior AAA 13.1 40.0 32.75
AA 10.8 40.0 27.0
A 8.1 40.0 20.3
BBB 4.8 40.0 12.0
BBB- 3.4 40.0 8.5
2006 CMBS Conduit Pools - Number of Pools = 70
Short-Senior AAA 28.4 40.0 71.0
Long-Junior AAA 12.4 40.0 31.0
AA 10.4 40.0 26.0
A 7.8 40.0 19.5
BBB 4.6 40.0 11.5
BBB- 3.3 40.0 8.3
2007 CMBS Conduit Pools - Number of Pools = 65
Short-Senior AAA 28.5 40.0 71.2
Long-Junior AAA 13.6 40.0 34.0
AA 10.5 40.0 26.1
A 8.0 40.0 19.9
BBB 4.7 40.0 11.5
BBB- 3.2 40.0 8.0
19a ten year horizon, defaults large enough to hit the BBB tranches for the 2004, 2005, and
2006 vintages of subordination would be expected to occur with probability 81%, 84%, 87%
and 87% respectively.
To determine how large subordination levels ought to be, Figure 5 shows Moody's default
rates on corporate bonds of dierent ratings between 1938 and 1995. The rating agencies
were adamant that their default measures apply across market sectors.23 Note that, ignoring
Figure 5: Moody's corporate and default rates
This gure plots Moody's default rates on corporate bonds of various ratings from 1938 to 1995.
Md ’ C t Bd D fl t R t Moody’s Corporate Bond Default Rates
Source:  “Corporate Bond Defaults and Default Rates 1938-1995, Moody’s 
Global Credit Research, January 1996 dispersion in the realized default levels, even if we always saw the median default rate of
21%, given our assumed loss given default of 40%, we would need an 8.4% subordination
level (21%  40%) to avoid defaults on the BBB securities. However, dispersion in defaults
magnies this eect. Taking both expected default and dispersion into account, we would
want 17.2% subordination for the BBB in 2006. This subordination level is far higher than
actually observed prior to the crisis, but is close to the subordination level observed in the
late 1990's.
23According to S&P, \Our ratings represent a uniform measure of credit quality globally and across all types
of debt instruments," (see \Principles-based Rating methodology for Global Structured Finance v Securities,"
Standard and Poors Ratings Direct Research, May 2007). According to Moody's, \The comparability of
these opinions holds regardless of the country of the issuer, its industry, asset class or type of xed income
security," (see Moody's Investors Services, 2004, \Introduction to Moody's Structured Finance Analysis and
Modelling," Presentation given by Federic Devron, May 13, 2004.
204.2 Comparison with historical default experience
The results above strongly suggest that subordination levels in the years immediately prior
to the recent crisis were too low (or, equivalently, that they implied expected default levels
on supposedly \safe" bonds that were too high). However, this conclusion is drawn from one
implementation of one model, and it is certainly possible to argue with many of the details of
our implementation. In particular, the model's estimated median 10-year cumulative default
rate of 21% is substantially higher than default rates observed in the few years immediately
prior to the recent crisis. Given this, how can we rule out the alternative explanation that
i. the model is just unduly pessimistic, ii. observed subordination levels were completely
reasonable given the market's expectations at the time, and iii. realized default rates were
substantially higher than those expectations?
To address this question, rather than redoing our analysis with many dierent models
and many dierent sets of assumptions, we instead compare its results with historical CMBS
default experience. Figure 6, based on Esaki (2002) [see also Esaki (2003)], shows realized
10-year default rates on loans issued from 1972{1996. As mentioned above, default rates in
the 1990s were substantially below the 21% median level predicted by our model. However,
it is clear from the gure that these default rates were markedly lower than at any other time
in the prior 20{25 years, perhaps reecting the large number of previously restructured loans
in the market then, in the aftermath of the savings and loan crisis. Defaults between 1972
and 1990 were uniformly much higher, never falling below 10%, at times exceeding 30%, and
with an average of around 20%, very close to the model's predictions.
All of our conclusions above about ex ante default likelihoods and subordination levels
thus apply equally well to observed default levels from 1972{1990 as they do to our model-
implied default rates, and we are forced to conclude that subordination levels of CMBS issued
in the years immediately prior to the crisis were too low. As a benchmark for comparison,
according to Moody's, the 10-year cumulative default rate on BBB-rated corporate bonds
is approximately ve percent [Moodys (1996)]. The simulation results shown in Figure 4
indicate that this rate of cumulative defaults is exceeded 95 times out of 100.
4.3 Ex post default behavior
While we have shown that subordination levels were too low ex ante, is it possible that even
much larger subordination levels would not have protected investment-grade CMBS against
the default levels seen during the recent crisis?
Figure 7 shows the cumulative default and loss rate as of March 3, 2010, for 444 CMBS
21Figure 6: Historical Realized Default Levels
This gure plots the lifetime default rates (loan counts) by origination cohort for 116,595 commercial
real estate loans held by a sample of major insurance companies. These default rates were reported











































pools by year of pool origination.24 The data for this graph were obtained from Bloomberg.
As shown, in this gure the default rates for 1999 vintage CMBS are currently over 15% and
the loss rates are 1.3% and the default rates for the 2000 vintages are nearly 13% and the
loss rates are 1.4%. Of course, due to loan extensions and current workouts, the ultimate
realized default and loss rates on these pools is not known. For the recent vintages, such
as the 2007 and 2008 CMBS pools, the default are already 5.2% and 6.9% even though the
pools are seasoned by only three and two year respectively. Although not shown in the
Figure, overall delinquencies in U.S. CMBS rose by 29 basis points in the last month and
overall delinquencies are about 6.9%. Approximately 30% of the newly delinquent loans in
March 2010 were from 2005 transactions and most of these loans are past their 2010 maturity
dates and are, therefore, categorized as non-performing matured loans. Recently accelerating
trends in CMBS delinquency rates, particularly for loans that are \maturity defaults" caused
by the inability to renance the balloon payments at the end of the amortization period
suggest that the elevated current levels of default performance for the 2007 and 2008 vintage
24Default is dened as the aggregate percent of pool balances that is 60 days delinquent, 90 days delinquent,
Real Estate Owned (REO), or in foreclosure. The loss rate is the total percentage of the pool balances that
have been lost due to default principal recoveries that are less than the outstanding loan principal.
22are likely to easily reach the historical averages reported by Esaki (2002) as these loans
continue to season. Thus, the long run default and delinquency rates of the current era
appear comparable to the documented experience of prior loan vintages over nearly the past
three decades.
Figure 7: CMBS default performance
This gure plots the average default and loss performance for 444 CMBS pools as of March 3,
2010, by year of pool origination. Default is dened as the aggregate percent of pool balances that
is sixty days delinquent, ninety days delinquent, Real Estate Owned (REO), or in foreclosure for
each pool vintage. The loss rate is the total percentage of the pool balances that have been lost
due to default principal recoveries that are less than the outstanding loan principal. The data for





















5 Performance of CMBX market
In many markets during the crisis, related credit default swaps (CDS) markets also collapsed,
and CDS have subsequently been blamed for causing the crisis in the rst place. For example,
in the residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) market, Stanton and Wallace (2009)
show that, during the crisis, prices for ABX.HE indexed CDS, backed by pools of RMBS,
the implied default rates over 100% on the underlying loans, and were uncorrelated with the
credit performance of the underlying loans. The performance of the ABX CDS may have
23contributed signicantly to liquidity problems in the underlying market, as many institutions
used ABX prices to mark their portfolios to market, and were forced to recognize large mark-
to-market losses as a result.
Stulz (2009) analyzes the CDS market more broadly, and concludes that it did not cause
the nancial crisis. However, a reasonable defense against underestimating subordination
levels in the CMBS market might be to point to a simultaneously malfunctioning CDS
market, and claim that many people were confused at this time. It is therefore important
to understand whether CDS backed by CMBS performed abnormally during the crisis (like
the ABX indexes), or whether CDS backed by CMBS were, in fact, mostly immune to the
turmoil observed in other markets.
The CMBX market is a market for credit default swap contracts that have been written
on the default performance over time of a xed-basket of specic tranches (CUSIPs) selected
from 25 CMBS pools. CMBX were issued semi-annually from January of 2006 through
January of 2008. For each vintage, seven CMBX contracts were issued, and each of these
contracts was written on the performance of a basket of 25 CMBS tranches with the same
credit rating. Prices in the CMBX market are quoted as $100 minus the price of protection
on $100 of CMBS principal. Thus, a quoted price of $93.59 for the AAA 06-1 CMBX
contract on March 30, 2008 would cost $6.41 up-front per $100 of notional. The advantage
of the CMBX prices for the purposes of our analysis is that these prices are widely viewed
as indicative of the expected default risk of specic tranches, their subordination structures,
and their credit ratings. By linking loan-performance data to the CMBX price dynamics, we
can determine whether: i. CMBX market prices are moving with default; ii. specic tranches,
their subordination structure and credit rating, dier in their sensitivities to the default risk
of the underlying mortgage collateral, iii. other factors, unrelated to default, appear to be
driving the CMBX prices.
In a recent paper, Driessen and Van Hemert (2009) nds that a structural option-
valuation model calibrated to REIT stock and option data explains more than 86% of daily
price variation in the 2007-2 AAA and AJ CMBX indices. Driessen and Van Hemert (2009)
also documents some predictability in short-run CMBX daily price changes, which he con-
cludes are consistent with price pressure from banks seeking to hedge their CMBS and
commercial mortgage exposure. These results for the CMBX market are quite dierent from
those of Stanton and Wallace (2009) for the ABX CDS market. To further analyze these re-
sults, we undertake a regression analysis of the factors that appear correlated with observed
CMBX price dynamics for indices with dierent subordination protection and credit ratings.
Figure 8 shows price dynamics for the 2006-1, 2006-2, 2007-1, 2007-2, and 2008-1 Markit
CMBX contracts on baskets of AAA short-senior (also called super-seniors), AJ (AAA long-
24seniors), AA, A, BBB, and BBB- tranches from March 31, 2008 through March 29, 2010.25
As shown, the CMBX indices experienced signicant price decreases (increases in the cost
of insuring $100 of notional) in the third quarter of 2008. By March 2009, the BBB(BBB-)
CMBX required an up front payment of about $91($92.2) per $100 of notional. After the
second quarter of 2009, however, all CMBX indices, except the BBB and BBB- indices, had
made signicant price gains (due to decreases in the cost of insuring $100 notional). Sur-
prisingly, the relatively higher subordination levels of 2008 pools did not appear to improve
the price performance of the 2008-1 CMBX. The likely reason for this outcome is that 20
of the 25 pools used in the 2008-1 were actually originated in 2007 and seven of these pools
were also included in the 2007-2 index.
The CMBX price dynamics reported in Figure 8 suggest that market participants believe
that the BBB and BBB- CMBS will experience signicant default related losses. We use
regression to analyze whether these observed price dynamics are primarily determined by
default experience, consistent with Driessen and Van Hemert (2009), or are driven by supply
and demand forces for hedging that are unrelated to the default experience of the underlying
commercial mortgages. The average subordination levels of the 118 conduit and fusion
CMBS pools that comprise the six CMBX indices are consistent with those reported in
Figure 1 and with the summary statistics presented in Table 1 for all conduit and fusion
CMBS. For each index, we obtain loan-level mortgage performance data from Bloomberg.
We then construct a monthly aggregate measure of the percent of total principal within a
CMBX index basket that is 30 day delinquent, 60 day delinquent, 90 day delinquent, Real
Estate Owned (REO), and foreclosed. We match each of the 25 CMBS tranches within
each index to the underlying mortgages for those pools and then track the aggregate default
performance for all the mortgage principal.
Following Stanton and Wallace (2009) and Driessen and Van Hemert (2009) we consider
the eects of market fundamentals such as the movements in REIT returns (measured by the
daily FNAR index on Bloomberg), repo rate dynamics (measured as the U.S. Treasury repo
over-night rate, Government General Collateral Repo Rate, downloaded from Bloomberg),
and the OIS spread (measured as OIS minus Libor obtained from Bloomberg). We obtain
S&P daily returns, the S&P volatility index, VIX, the 10-year constant maturity Treasury
rate, and the slope of the yield curve, measured as the dierences between the 10 year CMT
Treasury rate and the 3 month T-Bill rate) from Datastream. To capture the potential
eects of supply and demand imbalances in the market for insuring mortgage risk, we follow
prior authors (see Lamont and Stein (2004), Fishman, Hong, and Kubik (2007), and Jones
25Since the CMBX market is an over-the-counter market, the quoted prices are a trimmed average of prices
from the trading desks of Markit's member market makers in the CMBX.
25and Lamont (2002)) and use a value-weighted short-interest ratio (the market value of shares
sold short, divided by the average daily trading volume) for banks, investment banks, the
government sponsored enterprises (GSEs | Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), and the public
home builders.26 We obtain monthly data for the short-interest ratio from Shortsqueeze.com
from January 2006 to March 2010, and then use splines to estimate a daily series.28
Tables 5 through 9 report ve regression specications for each CMBX index. The rst
column presents the results of an OLS regression of the percent change in the indices on
changes in aggregate default performance of the underlying mortgage pools and REIT and
S&P return dynamics. Columns 2 and 3 of each table report an OLS specication and a xed
eects specication where we cluster the standard errors by CMBX vintage. In columns 4
and 5, we replace the individual credit variables with a summed variable equal to the sum
of the 60 day delinquency, 90 day delinquency, REO and foreclosure rate changes, and we
replace the individual short-interest ratio variables with a single variable equal to their sum.
We again run an OLS regression with these new measures and a xed eects regression where
we cluster the standard errors by the CMBX vintage. We use percentage changes in the daily
CMBX price series for the time period presented in Figure 8, March 31, 2008 through March
29, 2010.
Table 5 reports the results for the AAA short-senior CMBX. As shown, the key economic
determinants of AAA price changes are REIT and S&P returns, consistent with Driessen
and Van Hemert (2009). The sixty day delinquency rates exhibits a modest eect on price
changes, a small coecient and statistically signicant at the .10 level, and the aggregate
eect of the short interest ratio is not statistically signicant.
The results for the more junior AAA tranches, the AJ CMBX indices, are presented in
Table 6. As previously discussed the long-senior tranches experienced important reductions
in the rating agencies' subordination requirements between 2005 and 2007 { the vintages
included in the 2006 through 2008 CMBX. As shown in Table 6, the price dynamics of
the AJ CMBX are statistically signicantly related to measures associated with repo rate
26The short-interest ratio is a measure of how long it would take short sellers, in days, to cover their entire
positions if the price of a stock began to rise. A higher short-interest ratio is usually viewed by market
participants as a bearish signal about a specic stock, and higher ratios have been found to be associated
with other measures of demand pressure for shorting, such as high premia paid to borrow the stock.27
28The public companies that we track are: Ambac Financial Group Inc.; Bank of America Corp.; Bank of
New York Company; Barclays PLC; Capital One Financial Corp.; Centex Corp.; Citigroup Inc.; Countrywide
Financial Corp.; Credit Suisse Group; Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft; Fannie Mae; Flagstar Bancorp
Inc.; Freddie Mac; Goldman Sachs Group Inc.; HSBC Holdings PLC; JPMorgan Chase & Co.; Kaufman and
Broad; KeyCorp; Lennar Corp.; Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc.; Morgan Stanley; Pulte Homes Inc.; Sovereign
Bancorp Inc.; SunTrust Banks Inc.; The PNC Financial Services Group Inc.; The Ryland Group Inc.;
Toll Brothers Inc.; U.S. Bancorp; UBS AG; Wachovia Corp.; Webster Financial Corp.; and Wells Fargo &
Company.
26dynamics, short open interest on builders and the GSEs, both heavily involved in either
the production of, or the nancing on, multifamily housing, and on the short open interest
ratios of the investment banks. In addition, the sixty day delinquency rate has a statistically
signicant aect on these price dynamics at the .05 level. The summed credit eects and
summed short-interest ratios remain statistically signicant in the xed eects specication.
Results similar to those of the AJ CMBX index are again found in the regression re-
sults of the AA and A CMBX index price dynamics and these are reported in Table 7 and
Table 8, respectively. Again both the AA and the A tranches experienced signicant reduc-
tions in collateral support over the period and the CMBX price trends for these indices are
statistically signicantly related to changes in both the sixty day delinquency rates of the
underlying collateral and with the aggregate eects of the credit performance variables. The
short open interest channel is statistically signicant at the .05 level in the aggregate for
the AA Index written on AA tranches and is not statistically signicant for the A CMBX
written on A tranches.
Finally as shown in Table 9 and Table 10, a similar pattern appears in the regression
results for the BBB and BBB- CMBX. The sixty day delinquency rates have a statistically
signicant eect on the index price changes and the summed credit eects go through in
the xed eects regression. The aggregate changes in the short-interest ratio have a small
economic eect on CMBX price changes and they are statistically signicant at only the .10
level.
The eects of other dislocations in the xed income mortgage markets appear to have
varying levels of statistical and economic signicance in these regressions. The repo rate
and the OIS LIBOR spreads have statistically signicant eects on the price dynamics of
the more junior AJ, AA, A, BBB, and BBB- CMBX indices consistent with recent research
on the importance of these short-term funding sources for the securitized bond markets (See
Gorton and Metrick (2009). One anomalous result that we nd in all our regression is that
the 30 day delinquency rate appears to be positively correlated with the price changes of all
the junior CMBX indices. Recent moderate positive price changes in the CMBX market have
been associated with quite large positive changes in the 30 day delinquencies rates, suggesting
that the market does not see short-term delinquencies as a harbinger of serious problems in
the future. This optimistic view may, however, be premature because the March 2010 overall
rates of CMBS special servicing rose to 10%.29 Currently, an important proportion of special
serviced loans in CMBS pools includes loans that are 30 day delinquent, implying that the
29Special servicers exist in the CMBS pools to manage workouts and defaults. Typically, under the pooling
and servicing agreements, the Master Servicer would refer a given mortgage to the CMBS special servicer
only once the loan is 90 days delinquent, the borrower has declared bankruptcy, or the borrower has indicated
that default is imminent.
27borrower has indicated that default is likely despite the grace periods that are allowed in the
pooling and servicing agreements. In addition, loans on watchlist (indicating DSCR of less
than 110% or asset values of less than 80% of the origination value) now account for 19.12%
of the outstanding principal in the CMBS pools.
Our regression results are consistent with, and add to, those of Driessen and Van Hemert
(2009). They suggest that, in contrast to the ABX.HE CDS market, the CMBX index price
dynamics were largely driven by the default dynamics of the underlying mortgage collateral
and other price trends in real estate fundamentals, such as REIT return dynamics. In
addition, our regressions demonstrate that the credit channels to CMBX price dynamics are
important for the bonds that experienced the largest reductions in subordination levels from
2005 through 2007. Finally, again in contrast to the ABX CDS market, we nd only mixed
results for an important CMBX pricing eect driven by supply and demand imbalances in
the markets for hedging CMBS risk. Overall, our regression results and those of Driessen
and Van Hemert (2009) conrm that the CMBX index did not perform unusually during the
nancial crisis.
28Figure 8: CMBX prices,2008{2010
This gure plots the end-of-day prices for Markit CMBX for ve vintages of CMBX issuance in-





29Table 5: CMBX AAA Long-Senior Regression results
The table presents the regression results for daily percentage changes in the quoted prices of the
2006, 2007, and 2008 vintage AAA short-senior CMBX indices, using Markit CMBX end-of-day
price quotes from March 31, 2008 through March 29, 2010.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
%  AAA %  AAA %  AAA %  AAA %  AAA
Lag 1  CMBX Quoted Price Changes 0.283 0.289 0.289 0.290 0.290
(14.16) (14.05) (14.03) (14.16) (14.14)
 30 Day Delinquency 0.000896 0.000576 0.000564 0.00120 0.00118
(0.91) (0.53) (0.52) (1.20) (1.18)
 60 Day Delinquency -0.00276 -0.00315 -0.00323
(-1.62) (-1.75) (-1.78)
 90 Day Delinquency -0.00312 -0.00282 -0.00294
(-1.63) (-1.36) (-1.39)
 REO Rate -0.00362 -0.00343 -0.00382
(-0.41) (-0.37) (-0.41)
 Foreclosure Rate 0.0000458 0.000255 0.000590
(0.01) (0.05) (0.11)
 Principal Loss Rate -0.000372 -0.000116 0.00157 0.00402 0.00556
(-0.02) (-0.00) (0.06) (0.16) (0.22)
 S&P -0.0710 -0.114 -0.114 -0.118 -0.118
(-4.30) (-3.81) (-3.80) (-3.99) (-3.98)
 REIT Returns 0.00350 0.00482 0.00482 0.00357 0.00357
(2.54) (3.17) (3.17) (2.54) (2.54)
 Bank Ratio 0.0734 0.0732
(1.28) (1.28)
 Builder Ratio 0.00341 0.00382
(0.06) (0.07)
 GSE Ratio -0.000295 -0.000298
(-0.69) (-0.70)
 IV Bank Ratio -0.00429 -0.00430
(-2.27) (-2.27)
 LIBOR minus OIS -0.0101 -0.0101 -0.0124 -0.0124
(-1.34) (-1.34) (-1.67) (-1.67)
 Repo Rate -0.000588 -0.000588 -0.000578 -0.000578
(-1.03) (-1.03) (-1.01) (-1.01)
 10-year Treasury -0.00915 -0.00914 -0.0101 -0.0101
(-1.43) (-1.42) (-1.59) (-1.58)
 Slope (10-year CMT minus 3-month Rate) 0.0153 0.0153 0.0161 0.0161
(1.17) (1.16) (1.22) (1.22)
 VIX Rate -0.0190 -0.0190 -0.0210 -0.0210
(-2.12) (-2.12) (-2.35) (-2.35)
 Sum of credit variables -0.00274 -0.00282
(-1.80) (-1.82)
 Sum of short interest ratios -0.000430 -0.000432
(-1.04) (-1.04)
Constant 0.000405 0.000182 0.000188 0.000212 0.000222
(0.79) (0.33) (0.34) (0.41) (0.42)
Observations 2318 2190 2190 2190 2190
R2 0.0929 0.1063 0.1063 0.1033 0.1033
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01 30Table 6: CMBX AJ Regression results
The table presents the regression results for daily percentage changes in the quoted prices of the
2006, 2007, and 2008 vintage AJ long-senior CMBX indices, using Markit CMBX end-of-day price
quotes from March 31, 2008 through March 29, 2010.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
%  AJ %  AJ %  AJ %  AJ %  AJ
Lag 1  CMBX Quoted Price Changes 0.266 0.269 0.269 0.276 0.276
(13.40) (13.16) (13.14) (13.51) (13.49)
 30 Day Delinquency 0.00369 0.00280 0.00277 0.00510 0.00505
(2.08) (1.45) (1.43) (2.88) (2.84)
 60 Day Delinquency -0.00627 -0.00619 -0.00636
(-2.04) (-1.94) (-1.97)
 90 Day Delinquency -0.00597 -0.00358 -0.00389
(-1.72) (-0.97) (-1.04)
 REO Rate -0.00219 -0.00692 -0.00758
(-0.14) (-0.42) (-0.46)
 Foreclosure Rate -0.00327 -0.00456 -0.00448
(-0.36) (-0.49) (-0.46)
 Principal Loss Rate -0.000431 -0.00794 -0.00319 0.0140 0.0201
(-0.01) (-0.17) (-0.07) (0.31) (0.44)
 S&P -0.0853 -0.00669 -0.00671 -0.0257 -0.0255
(-2.87) (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.49) (-0.48)
 REIT Returns 0.00542 0.00724 0.00724 0.00573 0.00573
(2.19) (2.69) (2.69) (2.30) (2.29)
 Bank Ratio -0.159 -0.159
(-1.56) (-1.57)
 Builder Ratio -0.351 -0.351
(-3.51) (-3.50)
 GSE Ratio -0.00164 -0.00165
(-2.17) (-2.17)
 IV Bank Ratio -0.00593 -0.00594
(-1.77) (-1.77)
 LIBOR minus OIS -0.0171 -0.0171 -0.0165 -0.0165
(-1.28) (-1.28) (-1.25) (-1.25)
 Repo Rate -0.00222 -0.00222 -0.00219 -0.00219
(-2.19) (-2.19) (-2.16) (-2.16)
 10-year Treasury -0.0257 -0.0257 -0.0234 -0.0234
(-2.26) (-2.26) (-2.06) (-2.06)
 Slope (10-year CMT minus 3-month Rate) 0.0236 0.0235 0.0208 0.0208
(1.01) (1.01) (0.89) (0.89)
 VIX Rate 0.0148 0.0148 0.0103 0.0104
(0.93) (0.93) (0.65) (0.65)
 Sum of credit variables -0.00525 -0.00553
(-1.94) (-2.01)
 Sum of short interest ratios -0.00182 -0.00183
(-2.47) (-2.48)
Constant 0.000874 -0.000101 -0.0000674 0.000340 0.000371
(0.94) (-0.10) (-0.07) (0.37) (0.40)
Observations 2318 2190 2190 2190 2190
R2 0.0881 0.1065 0.1065 0.1000 0.1001
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01 31Table 7: CMBX AA Regression results
The table presents the regression results for daily percentage changes in the quoted prices of the
2006, 2007, and 2008 vintage AA CMBX indices, using Markit CMBX end-of-day price quotes from
March 31, 2008 through March 29, 2010.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
%  AA %  AA %  AA %  AA %  AA
Lag 1  CMBX Quoted Price Changes 0.375 0.371 0.371 0.388 0.388
(19.72) (18.96) (18.93) (19.93) (19.89)
 30 Day Delinquency 0.00472 0.00329 0.00325 0.00620 0.00614
(2.52) (1.65) (1.63) (3.37) (3.33)
 60 Day Delinquency -0.00691 -0.00658 -0.00683
(-2.13) (-2.00) (-2.06)
 90 Day Delinquency -0.00435 -0.00187 -0.00223
(-1.19) (-0.49) (-0.58)
 REO Rate -0.00905 -0.0176 -0.0190
(-0.53) (-1.04) (-1.11)
 Foreclosure Rate -0.00131 -0.00325 -0.00263
(-0.14) (-0.34) (-0.26)
 Principal Loss Rate 0.0108 -0.000335 0.00526 0.0311 0.0386
(0.24) (-0.01) (0.11) (0.68) (0.82)
 S&P -0.135 -0.0577 -0.0578 -0.0828 -0.0827
(-4.29) (-1.06) (-1.06) (-1.51) (-1.51)
 REIT Returns 0.00528 0.00726 0.00726 0.00543 0.00543
(2.02) (2.61) (2.61) (2.10) (2.10)
%  Bank Ratio -0.396 -0.396
(-3.78) (-3.78)
%  Builder Ratio -0.596 -0.595
(-5.73) (-5.72)
%  GSE Ratio -0.00160 -0.00161
(-2.05) (-2.06)
%  IV Bank Ratio -0.00637 -0.00638
(-1.84) (-1.85)
 LIBOR minus OIS -0.0250 -0.0251 -0.0211 -0.0211
(-1.82) (-1.82) (-1.54) (-1.54)
%  Repo Rate -0.00231 -0.00231 -0.00228 -0.00228
(-2.21) (-2.21) (-2.17) (-2.17)
%  10-year Treasury -0.0521 -0.0520 -0.0467 -0.0467
(-4.44) (-4.44) (-3.98) (-3.98)
 Slope (10-year CMT minus 3-month Rate) 0.0780 0.0779 0.0731 0.0730
(3.24) (3.23) (3.02) (3.01)
 VIX Rate 0.00505 0.00500 0.000106 0.000120
(0.31) (0.30) (0.01) (0.01)
 Sum of credit variables -0.00533 -0.00568
(-1.90) (-1.99)
 Sum of short interest ratios -0.00188 -0.00189
(-2.47) (-2.47)
Constant 0.000888 -0.000380 -0.000347 0.000367 0.000406
(0.91) (-0.38) (-0.35) (0.38) (0.42)
Observations 2318 2190 2190 2190 2190
R2 0.1679 0.2004 0.2004 0.1864 0.1865
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01 32Table 8: CMBX A Regression results
The table presents the regression results for daily percentage changes in the quoted prices of the
2006, 2007, and 2008 vintage A CMBX indices, using Markit CMBX end-of-day price quotes from
March 31, 2008 through March 29, 2010.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
%  A %  A %  A %  A %  A
Lag 1  CMBX Quoted Price Changes 0.374 0.366 0.366 0.383 0.382
(19.60) (18.52) (18.47) (19.42) (19.37)
 30 Day Delinquency 0.00447 0.00314 0.00308 0.00589 0.00579
(2.33) (1.52) (1.49) (3.10) (3.04)
 60 Day Delinquency -0.00758 -0.00714 -0.00754
(-2.28) (-2.10) (-2.19)
 90 Day Delinquency -0.00446 -0.00216 -0.00283
(-1.19) (-0.55) (-0.71)
 REO Rate -0.0119 -0.0204 -0.0222
(-0.68) (-1.17) (-1.26)
 Foreclosure Rate -0.00238 -0.00447 -0.00412
(-0.24) (-0.45) (-0.40)
 Principal Loss Rate 0.0203 0.00905 0.0192 0.0383 0.0500
(0.44) (0.18) (0.38) (0.81) (1.02)
 S&P -0.129 -0.0755 -0.0756 -0.102 -0.101
(-4.02) (-1.34) (-1.34) (-1.80) (-1.79)
 REIT Returns 0.00617 0.00832 0.00832 0.00608 0.00608
(2.31) (2.90) (2.89) (2.28) (2.28)
 Bank Ratio -0.424 -0.425
(-3.92) (-3.92)
 Builder Ratio -0.599 -0.597
(-5.57) (-5.56)
 GSE Ratio -0.000628 -0.000640
(-0.78) (-0.79)
 IV Bank Ratio -0.00685 -0.00687
(-1.92) (-1.92)
 LIBOR minus OIS -0.0303 -0.0304 -0.0261 -0.0262
(-2.13) (-2.14) (-1.84) (-1.85)
 Repo Rate -0.00264 -0.00264 -0.00261 -0.00262
(-2.45) (-2.45) (-2.41) (-2.41)
 10-year Treasury -0.0579 -0.0579 -0.0524 -0.0524
(-4.78) (-4.77) (-4.32) (-4.32)
 Slope (10-year CMT minus 3-month Rate) 0.0884 0.0882 0.0833 0.0831
(3.55) (3.54) (3.32) (3.32)
 VIX Rate -0.00594 -0.00601 -0.0112 -0.0111
(-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.65) (-0.65)
 Sum of credit variables -0.00597 -0.00655
(-2.06) (-2.22)
 Sum of short interest ratios -0.00101 -0.00103
(-1.29) (-1.30)
Constant 0.00125 -0.000107 -0.0000307 0.000663 0.000732
(1.24) (-0.10) (-0.03) (0.66) (0.73)
Observations 2318 2190 2190 2190 2190
R2 0.1652 0.1934 0.1935 0.1792 0.1794
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01 33Table 9: CMBX BBB Regression results
The table presents the regression results for daily percentage changes in the quoted prices of the
2006, 2007, and 2008 vintage BBB CMBX indices, using Markit CMBX end-of-day price quotes
from March 31, 2008 through March 29, 2010.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
%  BBB %  BBB %  BBB %  BBB %  BBB
Lag 1  CMBX Quoted Price Changes 0.368 0.359 0.358 0.374 0.373
(19.18) (18.11) (18.05) (18.94) (18.88)
 30 Day Delinquency 0.00344 0.00230 0.00223 0.00473 0.00464
(1.89) (1.17) (1.13) (2.62) (2.56)
 60 Day Delinquency -0.00667 -0.00635 -0.00673
(-2.11) (-1.96) (-2.06)
 90 Day Delinquency -0.00329 -0.000787 -0.00141
(-0.93) (-0.21) (-0.37)
 REO Rate -0.0138 -0.0224 -0.0242
(-0.84) (-1.35) (-1.44)
 Foreclosure Rate -0.00423 -0.00654 -0.00619
(-0.45) (-0.70) (-0.62)
 Principal Loss Rate 0.0283 0.0159 0.0250 0.0387 0.0496
(0.65) (0.34) (0.52) (0.85) (1.06)
 S&P -0.101 -0.0321 -0.0322 -0.0565 -0.0563
(-3.32) (-0.60) (-0.60) (-1.05) (-1.04)
 REIT Returns 0.00413 0.00608 0.00608 0.00418 0.00418
(1.62) (2.22) (2.22) (1.65) (1.64)
 Bank Ratio -0.385 -0.386
(-3.73) (-3.74)
 Builder Ratio -0.548 -0.547
(-5.36) (-5.35)
 GSE Ratio -0.000900 -0.000911
(-1.17) (-1.18)
 IV Bank Ratio -0.00609 -0.00611
(-1.79) (-1.79)
 LIBOR minus OIS -0.0346 -0.0347 -0.0307 -0.0307
(-2.56) (-2.56) (-2.27) (-2.28)
 Repo Rate -0.00196 -0.00196 -0.00192 -0.00192
(-1.91) (-1.91) (-1.86) (-1.86)
 10-year Treasury -0.0666 -0.0666 -0.0613 -0.0613
(-5.78) (-5.77) (-5.31) (-5.30)
 Slope (10-year CMT minus 3-month Rate) 0.104 0.104 0.0993 0.0991
(4.39) (4.38) (4.17) (4.16)
 VIX Rate -0.00233 -0.00240 -0.00707 -0.00706
(-0.14) (-0.15) (-0.44) (-0.43)
 Sum of credit variables -0.00534 -0.00590
(-1.94) (-2.10)
 Sum of short interest ratios -0.00123 -0.00125
(-1.64) (-1.66)
Constant 0.00129 0.0000530 0.000129 0.000749 0.000818
(1.35) (0.05) (0.13) (0.79) (0.86)
Observations 2318 2190 2190 2190 2190
R2 0.1541 0.1826 0.1826 0.1692 0.1694
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01 34Table 10: CMBX BBB- Regression results
The table presents the regression results for daily percentage changes in the quoted prices of the
2006, 2007, and 2008 vintage BBB- CMBX indices, using Markit CMBX end-of-day price quotes
from March 31, 2008 through March 29, 2010.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
%  BBB- %  BBB- %  BBB- %  BBB- %  BBB-
Lag 1  CMBX Quoted Price Changes 0.360 0.352 0.352 0.371 0.371
(18.69) (17.61) (17.57) (18.63) (18.59)
 30 Day Delinquency 0.00427 0.00289 0.00283 0.00544 0.00536
(2.38) (1.50) (1.46) (3.06) (3.00)
 60 Day Delinquency -0.00573 -0.00575 -0.00608
(-1.84) (-1.80) (-1.89)
 90 Day Delinquency -0.00261 -0.000330 -0.000914
(-0.75) (-0.09) (-0.24)
 REO Rate -0.0153 -0.0244 -0.0258
(-0.95) (-1.49) (-1.56)
 Foreclosure Rate -0.00539 -0.00741 -0.00734
(-0.59) (-0.80) (-0.75)
 Principal Loss Rate 0.0280 0.0163 0.0246 0.0382 0.0483
(0.65) (0.35) (0.52) (0.86) (1.05)
 S&P -0.103 -0.00234 -0.00238 -0.0283 -0.0281
(-3.42) (-0.04) (-0.05) (-0.53) (-0.53)
 REIT Returns 0.00273 0.00500 0.00500 0.00279 0.00279
(1.09) (1.86) (1.85) (1.11) (1.11)
 Bank Ratio -0.405 -0.406
(-3.99) (-3.99)
 Builder Ratio -0.584 -0.583
(-5.79) (-5.78)
 GSE Ratio -0.000957 -0.000966
(-1.26) (-1.28)
 IV Bank Ratio -0.00708 -0.00710
(-2.12) (-2.12)
 LIBOR minus OIS -0.0325 -0.0326 -0.0284 -0.0284
(-2.44) (-2.44) (-2.14) (-2.14)
 Repo Rate -0.00236 -0.00236 -0.00231 -0.00231
(-2.33) (-2.33) (-2.27) (-2.27)
 10-year Treasury -0.0633 -0.0633 -0.0578 -0.0578
(-5.58) (-5.57) (-5.08) (-5.08)
 Slope (10-year CMT minus 3-month Rate) 0.101 0.101 0.0962 0.0960
(4.33) (4.32) (4.09) (4.09)
 VIX Rate 0.00888 0.00883 0.00372 0.00373
(0.56) (0.55) (0.23) (0.23)
 Sum of credit variables -0.00503 -0.00555
(-1.85) (-2.00)
 Sum of short interest ratios -0.00134 -0.00135
(-1.82) (-1.83)
Constant 0.00114 -0.000188 -0.000115 0.000485 0.000548
(1.22) (-0.20) (-0.12) (0.52) (0.58)
Observations 2318 2190 2190 2190 2190
R2 0.1488 0.1813 0.1815 0.1656 0.1658
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01 356 CMBS Ratings and Regulatory Arbitrage
We have shown that the observed ination in CMBS ratings cannot be explained by any
change in the credit quality of the underlying loans. It is, however, consistent with the the-
oretical predictions of Opp et al. (2010). They argue that, for complex securities, regulatory
distortions can reduce or eliminate the incentive for rating agencies to acquire information,
in turn leading to rating ination. In this case, the relevant regulatory distortion is the
very generous risk-based capital weights applied to AAA and other highly rated CMBS, as
compared with the weights that apply to the underlying whole loans.
Table 11 reports the risk-based capital (RBC) requirements for CMBS held by Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)-regulated nancial institutions and for CMBS held
by life insurance companies regulated by state insurance commissioners. The table shows
that there were important regulatory changes by the FDIC in the risk-based capital rules
for nancial institutions on January 2, 2002. Prior to this rule change (as shown in the
bottom-left panel of the table), all investment grade CMBS and most commercial real estate
mortgages received a risk weight of 100%, implying that a $1 investment in CMBS required
the institution to hold $.08 of capital ($1  100%  8%).30 After 2001 (as shown in the
upper-left panel), whole commercial real estate mortgages and BBB-rated CMBS retained a
100% risk weight, whereas all AAA and AA-rated CMBS fell to a 20% risk-weight, requiring
only 1.6 cents of capital per dollar of investment. An A-rated CMBS received a 50% risk-
weight, requiring 4 cents of capital per dollar of investment, and BBB-rated CMBS received
a 100% risk weight. Although not shown, BB-rated CMBS carried a risk-weight of 200% or
16 cents of capital for every dollar of investment, and B or unrated CMBS bonds required
the nancial institution to hold capital equal to 100% of the face amount of the bond.
The right-hand side of Table 11 shows that the RBC weights for life insurance companies
were also modied over the same period. Prior to 2001, all AAA, AA, and A bonds (including
CMBS) used a factor of 0.3%, requiring $0.003 of capital per $1 of investment, whereas BBB-
rated CMBS required $0.01 per $1 of investment.31 Non-investment grade BB-rated bonds
had a factor of 4.0%. Unsecuritized commercial real estate mortgages were required on
average to use a factor of 2.25% or $0.0225 per $1 of investment.32 After 2001, all the risk-
30Additionally, 50% of that capital would be expected to be Tier 1 capital. Tier 1 capital includes common
stock, undivided prots, paid-in-surplus, non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock, and minority interests in
consolidated subsidiaries minus all intangible assets (with limited exceptions), identied losses, and deferred
tax assets in excess of certain limits.
31Insurance companies use either the book value of the investment or a value called the Adjusted Carrying
Value (ACV) as the basis for computing the RBC requirements. The ACV is a dynamic model-based
determination of the default-risk-adjusted value of investments and their required reserves.
32The range on this factor was 1.3% and 9.1%
36Table 11: Risk-Based Capital Requirements for Commercial Banks and Insurance Companies
The table presents the risk-based capital requirements for CMBS and Commercial Real Estate
Mortgages held by commercial banks and insurance companies. The upper part of the table reports
the risk-based capital requirements for the period 2002 through 2009. The lower part of the table
reports the capital requirements during the period 1997 through 2001 where the risk-based capital
weights for commercial banks holding investment grade CMBS were 100%.
Commercial Banks Life Insurance Companies
Risk Based Risk Based
Capital Capital
Requirement Requirement
Risk Capital per $1 of Asset per $1 of




AAA 20%4 8% $0.016 1 0.4% $0.004
AA 20% 8% $0.016 1 0.4% $0.004
A 50% 8% $0.040 1 0.4% $0.004
BBB 100% 8% $0.080 2 1.3% $0.013
b) Non-Investment BB 200% 8% $0.160 3 4.6% $0.046
Commercial Real




AAA 100% 8% $0.080 1 0.3% $0.003
AA 100% 8% $0.080 1 0.3% $0.003
A 100% 8% $0.080 1 0.3% $0.003
BBB 100% 8% $0.080 2 1.0% $0.010
b) Non-Investment Grade BB 200% 8% $0.160 3 4.0% $0.040
Commercial Real
Estate Mortgages BBB 100% 8% $0.080 2.25%6 $0.0225
1 Source: Rosenblatt (2001)
2 Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners (2009)
3 The basis may also be the Adjusted Carrying Value
4 IO's and PO's are not eligible for less than 100% risk weighting.
5 The factors for non-insured commercial loans in good standing could vary between 1.3% and 9.1%.
5 The factors for non-insured commercial loans in good standing could vary between 1.125% and 7.87%.
37based capital factors for life insurance companies rose. The AAA, AA, and A-rated CMBS
rose to 0.4%, BBB-rated CMBS rose to 1.3%, and below investment grade rose to 4.6%. The
average factor for unsecuritized commercial real estate mortgages held in insurance company
portfolios rose to 2.6%, with a slightly narrower range of 1.125%{7.87%.
Table 11 shows that the RBC requirements for holding unsecuritized investment-grade
commercial real estate mortgages on bank balance sheets were 5 times as high as for AAA
CMBS after 2001, and were 6.5 times as high for insurance companies after 2000. Prior to the
regulatory change in 2001, banks would have been indierent to holding whole commercial
loans or investment grade CMBS, whereas after the regulatory shift, investment-grade CMBS
required signicantly less capital. Insurance companies also faced strong incentives to hold
CMBS in preference to unsecuritized commercial real estate mortgages given the important
dierentials in risk-based capital requirements between CMBS and loans.33
Figure 9 shows that, in response to these regulatory incentives, the funding of commercial
real estate mortgages through CMBS grew rapidly between 1995 and 2009. Prior to 2000,
the life insurers were the second largest single funding source (behind commercial banks) for
commercial real estate lending in the United States. However, by 2000 the CMBS market
overtook the insurers. By 2006, the CMBS market share had grown to 24%, while the
insurance company share had fallen to about 10%. Commercial banks maintained an average
50% market share throughout the period.
Tracking the comparative CMBS ownership positions of the commercial banks has only
been possible since 2009, when the FDIC began reporting securitized commercial real estate
positions. As of Q2 2009, CMBS represented only .4% of the total assets of FDIC-insured
nancial institutions.34 However, 89% of all the commercial bank holdings of CMBS (about
$51 billion as of the third quarter of 2009) was held by ten large banks.35 To track the
33It is not appropriate to compare the risk-based capital percentages between the banks and the insurance
companies. There are a number of factors leading to this lack of comparability: 1) The accounting basis for
insurers is statutory accounting; 2) life insurers set up reserves that are separate from the risk-based capital
minimum capital requirements (such as Asset Valuation Reserves and reserves for asset/liability analysis); 3)
tiering of capital is not done for insurers, as it is for banks, and some types of lower tier capital is not allowed
insurers under statutory accounting rules; 4) the insurance factors are based on the default rates of all bonds
of a given rating not just CMBS; 5) insurance companies have longer time horizon for holding investments
than banks; and 6) there are numerous other dierences related to the legal and regulatory environments of
the two types of institutions.
34This is the earliest date for which the Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) provide infor-
mation on the stock of CMBS investments on bank balance sheets along with the face amount of total
assets.
35These banks were Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo Bank, State Street Corporation,
Citigroup, PNC Financial Services, Bank of New York Mellon, Capital One, HSBC, RBS/Citizens, and U.S.
Bancorp (see Inside Mortgage Finance Bank Mortgage Database). All of these banks either received bailout
support from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) or some other form of bailout assistance from
regulatory authorities (in the case of HSBC and RBS).
38ownership positions of insurance companies, we used data generously provided by Alberto
Manconi, Massimo Massa, and Ayako Yasuda.36
Figure 9: Commercial Real Estate Mortgage Holdings in the United States, 1995-2009
This gure plots the stock of commercial real estate mortgages held by commercial banks, life
insurance companies, commercial mortgage backed security special purpose vehicles, and other.
The data were obtained from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Z.1 for June 1998,









































































Commercial Banks Insurance Companies CMBS Other
Figure 10 shows the annual growth rates in the stock of CMBS and public AAA-CMBS
from 1999{2007.37 The gure also shows the growth rates in the portfolio holdings of all
CMBS and AAA-CMBS for insurance companies using data from Manconi et al. (2010).
As shown, the growth in the AAA-CMBS portfolio holdings of the insurance companies
far outstripped all other growth rates between 1998 and 2001. After 2001, the insurance
industry tracked the overall growth rate in AAA-CMBS through 2004, and then the insurers
gradually slowed their AAA acquisitions. By 2005, because of the important changes in the
AAA subordination structure and signicant trends in ratings up-grades of existing CMBS
36These data are used in Manconi, Massa, and Yasuda (2010).
37Our computation of the stock of AAA-CMBS is computed by aggregating the balances of the outstanding
AAA-rated CMBS bonds each year using the 711 public CMBS deals in the ABSnet database. We do not
have information on the approximately 200 privately placed CMBS deals.
39bonds to AAA ratings, the stock of AAA-CMBS represented about 88% of the overall public
CMBS market. The demand by insurers for these AAA-CMBS, however, exceeded even this
very rapid growth rate and by 2005 the insurers held more than 50% of the total stock of
CMBS. Unfortunately, data limitations for the commercial banks do not allow us to perform
a similar analysis of the growth in CMBS holdings of the commercial banks. However, private
communication with a senior risk manager at one of the top commercial banks conrms that
similar trends existed there as well.
Figure 10: Annual Growth Rates of the CMBS and AAA CMBS Holdings of Life Insurance
Companies Compared to the Annual Growth Rates of the Overall Stock of CMBS and AAA
CMBS in the United States, 1999-2007
This gure plots the annual growth in the portfolio holdings of CMBS and AAA rated CMBS
by the life insurance companies in the United States and the annual growth rate for the stock of
CMBS and AAA CMBS in the public CMBS deals in the United States. The data to compute the
annual growth rates for CMBS and AAA CMBS portfolio holdings of the life insurance companies
was generously provided by Alberto Manconi, Massimo Massa, and Ayako Yasuda. The growth
rates for the stock of overall CMBS was computed by the Authors using Flow of Funds Accounts
of the United States, Z.1 for June 1998, June 2001, June 2004, June 2007, and June 2010. The
growth rates for the stock of overall AAA CMBS was computed by the Authors using using ratings
and bond performance data to aggregate the outstanding stock of AAA CMBS bonds for public
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Calculating the economic implications of these capital weights for the risk management
40practices of regulated nancial institutions and insurance companies is challenging for a
number of reasons. First, ratings ination implies that AAA-rated bonds would have higher
credit risk over time, and the reduced capital requirements would allow rms to lever up
more. Thus, we should expect to see greater default risk over time for rms holding large
positions in AAA-rated CMBS, which could be measured by valuing put options on the
rms' equity. However, CMBS holdings represent only small percentages of the total assets
of FDIC-insured nancial institutions and regulated life insurance companies so accurately
measuring the increment to default risk using, say, the standard Black/Scholes computations
would be dicult. Second, Froot and Stein (1998a,b), Froot (2001), and Merton and Perold
(1993) argue that applying the classical approach to capital budgeting, assuming Modigliani
and Miller (1958) and/or frictionless hedging, to determine the incremental cost of capital
for any given incremental investment decision, is likely to understate the true economic
costs of illiquid bank and insurance company investments. These investments impose risks
on these rms, which might be diversiable by shareholders, but because they cannot be
readily hedged by the rms, they require holding more equity capital.
Table 12: Risk-Based Capital Savings from Holding AAA-CMBS instead of Commercial
Real Estate Mortgages in 2007
The table presents the risk-based capital requirements for the actual AAA-CMBS holdings of the
insurance companies and the estimated AAA-CMBS of commercial banks in 2007. We also report
hypothetical risk-based capital requirements for the same book value of the AAA-CMBS holdings
if the same position had been held as commercial real estate mortgages. The data for the insurance
company holdings of AAA-CMBS was obtained from Manconi et al. (2010). The estimated value
for the AAA-CMBS holdings of commercial banks was computed using the FDIC reported share
of commercial bank holdings of CMBS to the stock of U.S. CMBS (a 9.5% share) to estimate the
2007 holdings and then multiplying this value by our estimate of the stock of AAA-CMBS in 2007
(70% of the outstanding stock).
Bank RBC Insurance RBC
($ billions) ($ billions)
AAA-CMBS Held in 2007 35.81 188.50
2007 Risk-Based Capital required for AAA-CMBS 0.570 0.750
2007 Risk-Based Capital required for Holding
Equivalent as Commercial Real Estate Mortgages 2.86 4.90
Capital Savings 2.29 4.15
Despite not having direct measures of the economic implications of ratings ination on
insurers and commercial banks capital structure, Table 12 reports ballpark approximations
for the potential savings in risk-based capital from holding the equivalent of the book value
of AAA-CMBS as commercial real estate mortgages. The AAA-CMBS holdings of the insur-
41ance companies were obtained from Alberto Manconi, Massimo Massa, and Ayako Yasuda,
and the AAA-CMBS holdings of commercial banks were estimated using the proportional
bank holdings of CMBS in 2009 combined with our estimate of the percentage of the stock
of CMBS that was AAA in 2007 (70%). The actual insurance company holdings for AAA-
CMBS in 2007 was $188.5 billion and the estimated aggregate holdings of the commercial
banks were $35.81 billion. Using the 2007 RBC requirements, the RBC for the commercial
banks is estimated to be $570 million and the RBC for the insurance companies is $750
million. If the banks and the insurance companies each held an amount equivalent to their
AAA-CMBS investments as commercial real estate mortgages, their risk-based capital costs
would have been $2.86 billion and $4.90 billion, respectively. This represents a $2.29 billion
capital savings for the banks and a $4.9 billion savings for the insurance companies for the
AAA-ratings label. This dierential clearly introduced signicant incentives for insurers and
banks to hold AAA-CMBS, providing an explanation for the marked trends in holdings over
time identied above. These trends, together with our regulatory capital-based explana-
tion, are also consistent with general evidence provided in Acharya and Richardson (2010)
and Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter (2010) that regulatory arbitrage fundamen-
tally drove bank and insurance company investment strategies prior to the nancial crisis,
and that these strategies served to greatly increase the leverage of these rms and their
susceptibility to insolvency with even minor shocks to fundamentals.
7 Conclusions
By studying the CMBS market, we shed new light on the role of the rating agencies and
subordination levels in the nancial crisis of 2007{2009. While the rating agencies have
been blamed by many for over-optimistic ratings, it has been hard to pin down their role
unambiguously due to the presence of many other confounding factors. We show that almost
all of these confounding factors are absent in the CMBS market. In particular, unlike with
residential loans, commercial loans did not signicantly change their characteristics during
this period, and commercial lenders did not change the way they priced a loan with given
characteristics. During the crisis, while commercial loans bore their share of defaults, realized
defaults were in line with levels observed over almost the whole of the 40-year period before
the crisis, excluding the most recent few years. Finally, unlike the ABX market, the CMBX
market for CDS backed by CMBS also behaved normally during the crisis.
Putting all of this together, we see that both before and during the crisis, the only
signicant shift in the market was the reduction in allowable subordination levels by the
rating agencies. By contrast, neither lenders nor traders in the CMBX market changed their
42behavior. It is possible that these over-optimistic subordination levels were caused by too
much reliance on very recent default data, but whatever the cause, the overall eect was to
expose investors in \safe" CMBS bonds to losses (caused by defaults completely in line with
both model-implied expectations and historical experience) that would have been completely
avoided had subordination levels remained at their 2000 levels.
43A Calculating implied volatilities
Calculating implied volatilities for commercial mortgages is similar to using option prices to
infer implied volatility for an equity option, and requires a mortgage pricing model. We use
the two-factor model rst proposed by Titman and Torous (1989), in which the value of a
mortgage, M, is a function of interest rates, r, property prices, p, and time, t.
Interest rates In Titman and Torous (1989), interest rates are governed by the Cox,
Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) model,
drt = (r   rt)dt + r
p
rt dWr;t; (5)
where  is the rate of reversion to the long-run mean, r, and r governs interest rate
volatility. The price of interest rate risk is determined by the product rt. We estimate the
following parameters for the interest rate process, using the methodology of Pearson and






Property prices Property prices follow the geometric Brownian motion process,
dpt = (p;t   qp)pt dt + ppt dWp;t; (6)
where p;t is the expected return on the property, qp is the net income (on an unlevered
basis), and p is the volatility of the property return. We assume p;t = rt + , where rt
is the risk-free interest rate and  is the risk-premium (assumed constant) on the property
type in question, discussed below.
For pricing, we use the \risk-neutral" process,
dpt = (rt   qp)pt dt + ppt dWp;t; (7)
in which p;t is replaced with rt.
The key parameters for the property price process in equation (6) are p;t, the expected
return on the property (equal to rt, the risk-free interest rate, plus , the risk-premium) and
qp, the net income. As discussed above, we solve for the implied volatilities using the risk
44neutral property price process, but we also need the risk premium, , in order to estimate
default probabilities. Both qp and  are estimated from market data. qp is estimated from
the realized income returns, obtained from NCREIF, between the rst quarter of 1978 and
the rst quarter of 2005, 38 leasing to estimates of:
qp =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
7:90% for oce properties;
7:84% for multifamily properties;
7:85% for retail properties;
8:47% for industrial properties
7:99% for other properties:
We estimate the risk premium, , using the average excess return for NCREIF properties
over 90 day T-Bills, quarterly from 1978 to 2005, leading to the estimates: The estimates
values of  for each property type are:39
 =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
3:11% for oce properties;
5:79% for multifamily properties;
4:22% for retail properties;
4:26% for industrial properties;
3:85% for other properties:
Pricing p.d.e. Given the above processes for interest rates and property prices, the value
of a commercial mortgage M(pt;rt;t) with maturity date T > t, paying coupon C, must













rMrp + ((r   r)   r)Mr (8)
+ ((r   qp)pt)Mp + Mt   rM + C = 0;
where E [dWrdWp] = dt, subject to boundary conditions described in detail in Titman and
Torous (1989). For our initial baseline estimates, we assume that  = 0, and later consider
38The returns are measured as (Net Operating Income )  (Beginning market value + :5 
capital improvements   :5  partial sales   :333  Net Operating Income). The adjustments are made
to: 1) account for the assumption that net operating income (NOI) is received at the end of each month
during the quarter; 2) the assumption that capital improvements occur at mid-quarter; 3) the assumption
that partial sales occur at mid-quarter; 4) the assumption that the NOI is received monthly so that the cash
ow received from the NOI in eect reduces the average investment in the property by .333 of NOI. These
measures are the average property-type specic income returns for the properties held in the investment
portfolios of pension funds.
39We use the excess return estimate for the national property series as our estimate for an \other" category
of properties which includes hotels, healthcare, self-storage, among others that exist in CMBS pools. The
NCREIF return series do not include these other categories.
45the implications of relaxing this assumption through a series of robustness checks. We solve
the model numerically, using a nite dierence method to value the security and also to
determine the critical default boundary.40 Given this valuation model, the implied volatility
for a given mortgage is then determined (also numerically) by nding the value of p at
which the model prices a newly issued mortgage at par.
40For details of the nite dierence method used, see Gourlay and McKee (1977) and Downing, Stanton,
and Wallace (2005).
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